By Ashrika Paruthi
Ashrika Paruthi argues that China will continue employing low-risk economic initiatives to coax the Taliban into securing Chinese borders.
Introduction
The withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the consequent Taliban takeover has led to widespread speculations about the possibility of China increasing its contributions, especially economic contributions to Afghanistan, in order to fill the power vacuum. This essay aims to illustrate that China will continue employing low-risk economic initiatives, solely to coax the Taliban into securing Chinese borders, instead of significantly increasing its contributions to Afghanistan’s economy. It will do so by using contrasting perspectives and analyses wherein neoliberalism, economic nationalism, and constructivism agree to the statement and defensive neorealism disagrees.
First, it will highlight China’s current trend of low-risk, insignificant economic investments in Afghanistan. Second, a combination of theoretical perspectives from neoliberalism and economic nationalism will argue that U.S. withdrawal will intensify China’s perception of the Taliban-led Afghanistan through a prism of economic opportunities. Third, the constructivist analysis will elucidate that China will accommodate the Taliban-led Afghanistan through significant economic contributions because of its own status aspirations. Lastly, through a defensive neorealist analysis, it will assert that China will continue to employ insignificant investments to merely bait the Taliban into securing China’s borders by helping it tackle radical Islamic terrorism in its Xinjiang Province.
Current Trend: Low-Risk Economic Investments
China’s economic investments in Afghanistan exhibit a trend of insignificant, low-risk investments, along with no strong inclination to engage further economically. In terms of export revenue, Afghanistan earned a total of “$879 million” in 2017, out of which a mere amount of “$2.86 million” was generated through the export of goods to China (Felbab-Brown 2020, p. 8). The humanitarian aid pledged by China has also been immensely modest- in 2007, out of its “global foreign aid”, amounting to an approximate total of $25 billion, a “tiny fraction” of it, i.e. $200 million was committed to Afghanistan in 2010 and only $58 million was actually “disbursed” (Ng 2010, p. 5). Despite the hype, this trend has been apparent in China’s recent announcement of aid to the Taliban-led Afghanistan as well- it stated the meagre provision of $31 million (Hindustan Times, 9 September 2021).
Further to this, China’s major resource extraction projects in Afghanistan have not been “materialised” (Sacks 2021). For the Mes Aynak mine project, China has not made any of the “infrastructure investments” it had promised to make initially, in addition to declining “interest in putting resources and effort into extraction” (Roy 2017, p. 108; Felbab-Brown 2020, p. 9). Similarly, with regards to the Amu Darya Basin Oil project, it has not followed through on its commitment to construct an “oil refinery in northern Afghanistan” (Roy 2017, p. 108)
Additionally, Afghanistan has also been left out of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)- China’s main foreign policy initiative aimed at establishing “land and sea infrastructural links” to promote commercial activity both “within and beyond Asia” (Marsden 2021)- in a significant way. Even after signing a “BRI agreement” in 2016, with Afghanistan- that made a legal commitment to funding projects worth $100 million- and discussing the railroad connecting Pakistan and China through Afghanistan and Central Asia or the “dream project railroad”, China has not only made “no concrete BRI investments” (Felbab-Brown 2020, p. 8). It has also not defined the process of Afghanistan’s overall integration (Felbab-Brown 2020, p. 8).
Neoliberalism and Economic Nationalism: Intensified Perception Through a Prism of Economic Opportunities
Nonetheless, based on a combination of theoretical perspectives from neoliberalism and economic nationalism, it can be argued that after the U.S. withdrawal, China will intensify its perception of the Taliban-led Afghanistan through a prism of economic opportunities. Contrary to popular beliefs, as an emerging power, China, controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is not determined to challenge the “basic rules and principles” that constitute the “liberal international order” (Dams, Van Der Putten 2015, p. 11). Instead, it aims to “gain more authority and leadership within it”, especially through greater economic integration within the global community (Dams, Van Der Putten 2015, p. 11).
Its unique experience of neoliberalism with the state being the “designer and instigator of reform” or “state neoliberalism” exemplifies the phenomenon- its government plays the role of a mechanism with a rudimentary purpose of facilitating “condition for profitable capital accumulation” of “both domestic and foreign capital” (Coase, Wang 2013, p. 9; Chu, So 2010, p. 49). While the state still uses “economic measures of adjustment and control”, it has actively been fostering neoliberal reform policies such as corporatisation of state-owned enterprises, to expand the private sector since the 1980s (Chu, So 2010, p. 59).
According to Friedrich List’s National System of Political Economy, what has further compelled China to do so is its “national economic interest”- an encapsulation of the “expectations of society in the long-term goals of overall national economic development”, which ensures citizens’ compliance “at every stage of development trajectory” (Watson 2014, p. 33). China’s national economic interest changed drastically after the disastrous Cultural Revolution in the 1970s the objective of which was to crush the “capitalist market” and the “capitalist class- which led to the condemning of party leaders as “capitalist roaders” (Chu, So 2010, p. 49, p. 53).
These perspectives are clearly suggestive of the fact that China will jump at the occasion of ‘filling the economic vacuum’ to further drive its economy. Especially since Afghanistan undeniably has the potential of providing the resources and opportunities it needs- it has untapped mineral deposits worth “worth $1 trillion or more”, and underdeveloped infrastructure, making it the ‘prime ground’ for the BRI (Marlow, Curran 2021).
Constructivism: Increased Accommodation Through Significant Economic Contributions
Similarly, according to a constructivist analysis of the situation, China- previously irked by growing U.S. Military activities- will accommodate the Taliban-led Afghanistan through significant economic contributions, due to its imperativeness for China’s own “status aspirations” in the global arena. Accommodation, through a constructivist perspective, is the process of accentuating considerations of a “rising power” and perceiving “material acquisitions and diplomatic ties” as enablers of accommodation (Mohanty 2017, p. 5). Herein, accommodation is the “greater or lesser adaptation” of Afghanistan’s requirements, expectations as a “weaker state”, by China as a “rising power” (Mohanty 2017, p. 5).
What necessitates the accommodation of the Taliban-led Afghanistan, is the fact that accommodation entails much more than “simple reconciliation”, which does not have to persist if the reconciled state becomes dissatisfied with the rising power’s system (Paul 2016, p. 5). Accommodation either encompasses “pre-rational considerations” or is not, at the very least, “entirely amenable to rational bargaining” (Mohanty 2017, p. 4). Therefore, to ensure its status as a “preeminent regional player”, especially in control of Afghanistan, China has been playing a key facilitating role in multilateral, bilateral meetings since 2016, for establishing and strengthening its diplomatic ties (Mohanty 2017, p. 4). One of most significant meetings were the ones within the Quadrilateral Coordination Group comprising of Pakistan, the United States and Afghanistan, held to chalk out ways for “reconciliation” as the Taliban continued “to justify their insurgency” (Mohanty 2017, p. 20; Khan 2016, p. 2, p. 4).
It has also been making economic investments- even though modest, these indicate that its interest in Afghanistan started growing in 2014, amidst the very trifling rise of speculations about the complete U.S. withdrawal, as the U.S. intervention had forced it to keep a “low profile”, take up “encirclement”, instead of active engagement (Hong 2013, p. 5; Mohanty 2017, p. 9). They also not only highlight that China has always recognised the strategic importance of Afghanistan for elevating its economy and global status, but also provide reasonable grounds to believe that China will now increase its overall economic investment to accommodate the Taliban-led Afghanistan.
Defensive Neorealism: Continued Employment of Insignificant Investments
Paradoxically, the defensive neorealist analysis argues that China will continue to employ insignificant investments. It will do so to merely bait the Taliban into securing China’s borders by helping it tackle radical Islamic terrorism in its Xinjiang Province. One of the pioneers of defensive neorealism, Kenneth Waltz, has asserted that- in the absence of a global government, i.e. “in anarchy” the most important end is “security”, since “survival” is a prerequisite for safely seeking “other goals such as tranquillity, profit, and power” (Lobell 2010, p. 9-10). Further to this, states only seek the “adequate amount” or the “margin of power” required for enabling the “right of self preservation” (Golovics 2017, p. 365; Der Derian 1995, p. 30). As a result, the initial priority of the states is to “maintain their positions in the system” instead of maximising their “power”and the “calculations of central decision makers” are considered “paramount” in the case of an impending “external threat” (Lobell 2010, p. 10; Taliaferro 2000, 142).
Undeniably, the Taliban-led Afghanistan poses a direct threat to China- China’s Xinjiang Province been deemed as a “breeding ground for the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism”, by Chinese authorities (Pandey 2019, p. 3). Dominated by Uyghur muslims, it is closely linked to the violent Uyghur separatist East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), striving for an “independent Xinjiang”, separate from the governing Chinese Han majority (Millward, Peterson 2020, p. 3). This movement was incessantly bolstered by Afghanistan, due to its connections with both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, dating back far before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Huasheng 2012, p. 3).
In fact, the Taliban regime, between 1996 to 2011, acted as a “spiritual agitator”, supplied weapons, provided training, and safe haven to those separatists who fled China after expanding the movement’s footprint within it (Huasheng 2012, p. 3). Even after Taliban’s defeat in 2011, Uyghur separatists have been able to successfully execute more terror attacks in China, for instance, in 2014, the attack in May killed 31 people after “two cars crashed into a market”, and the assailants hurled bombs into the crowd in Urumqi (Clarke, Kan 2017, p. 3). Adding to that, an affiliate of the “Islamic State” (IS), called the “ISIS-K”, with “K” or the “historical region of Khorasan” formed up in Afghanistan in 2015 and also established itself in the Badakhshan region, which shares a border with China (Fischer, Stanzel 2021, p. 3).
Subsequently, China has successfully used its investments only to try and coax the Taliban into ensuring its security interests. In July 2021, representatives from the Taliban visited Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, in Tianjin, to discuss the newly-formed Taliban government’s role in stabilising China’s border security and keeping “ISIS-K at bay” (Fischer, Stanzel 2021, p. 3). Most recently, after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, China reiterated that it “hopes” for the Taliban to “make a clean break with the ETIM and other terrorist groups” along with carrying out a resolute “crackdown” on them (Ghosh 2021). In response to this, the Taliban made “three commitments”, which included not allowing “any training” and creation of any “recruitment centre” on Afghan territory, as well as preventing any attempts at “fundraising” for carrying out “foreign agenda” (Ghosh 2021). What followed these commitments was the extension of China’s warm welcome to the Taliban government through the announcement of economic aid (Ghosh 2021). These engagements also include the “Doha Agreement” or “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan”, signed by the Taliban, after it was formally recognised as a “political party” in February 2020 (Attanayake, Haiqi 2021, p. 2).
Clearly, China has been mindful of what defensive realists call a “security dilemma”- the probability of provoking or antagonising another state, in this case the Taliban-led Afghanistan, by increasing “its own security” (Lobell 2010, p. 11). Hence, “instead of harshly condemning the Taliban by name”, China has increased “the joint gains from cooperation”, evident through its economic investments, collaboration for joint projects such as the BRI (Huasheng 2012, p. 8; Lobell 2010, p. 11). Therefore, it can be claimed that even if China does increase its economic investments, it will only be to further strengthen its grip on the Taliban, but it’s unlikely since it has been able to do so with insignificant economic investments as well.
Conclusion
All in all, while the perspectives and analyses, in agreement of the statement that China will significantly increase its economic contributions to the Taliban-led Afghanistan, from neoliberalism, economic nationalism, constructivism are compelling the most plausible argument is the one presented by defensive neorealism, which is in disagreement of the statement.
Neoliberalist, economic nationalist and constructivist perspectives suggest that China will accommodate the Taliban-led Afghanistan by increasing its economic contributions not only to maximise its profits, but also to obtain greater power and influence within the international liberal order as a rising power and to ensure its status as a major regional player.
However, China’s current trend of low-risk, insignificant investments in Afghanistan and the promise of extending economic aid to the Taliban in exchange for its guarantee of securing China’s borders suggest otherwise. It is evident that the defensive neorealist analysis is the most plausible one- while bolstering economic profit maximisation is imperative for China as a rising power, the security of its territory, its own preservation in the national arena, trumps everything.
Therefore, China is not likely to increase its economic investments, and instead it will continue employing insignificant, low-risk investments, just to avoid harshly condemning the Taliban and to bait it into securing China’s borders by helping it tackle radical Islamic terrorism in its Xinjiang Province.
Reference List
Attanayake, C, Haiqi, Z 2021, ‘Understanding China in Taliban-led Afghanistan’, Journal of Indo Pacific Affairs, pp. 1-5, viewed 22 October 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Aug/ 25/2002839003/-1/-1/1/ATTANAYAKE%20&%20HAIQI.PDF
Chu, Y, So, AY 2010, ‘State Neoliberalism: The Chinese Road to Capitalism’, in Y Chu, AY Su (eds), Chinese Capitalisms: International Political Economy Series, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 46-72
Clarke, CP, Kan, PR 2017, ‘Uighur Foreign Fighters: An Underexamined Jihadist Challenge’, Policy Brief: International Center for Counter-Terrorism- The Hague, no. 5, pp. 1-19, viewed 22 October 2021, https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2017/11/ClarkeKan-Uighur-Foreign-Fighters-An Underexamined-Jihadist-Challenge-Nov-2017-1.pdf
Coase, R, Wang, N 2013, ‘How China Became Capitalist’, Cato Policy Report, Vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 7- 10, viewed 22 October 2021, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/policy-report/ 2013/1/cprv35n1-1.pdf
Dams, T, Van Der Putten, FP 2015, ‘China and Liberal Values in International Relations: Opposing the Promotion of Democracy, Human Rights and Liberal Market Economy’, Clingendael Report: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, pp. 1-25, viewed 22 October 2021, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ China_and_Liberal_Values_in_International_Relations.pdf
Der Derian, J 1995, ‘The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard’, In RD Lipschutz (ed.), On security, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 24-45.
Felbab-Brown, V 2020, ‘A Bri(dge) Too Far: The Unfulfilled Promise and Limitations of China’s Involvement in Afghanistan’, Brookings: Global China, Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World, pp. 1-18, viewed 22 October 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ fp_20200615_china_afghanistan_felbab_brown.pdf
Fischer, S, Stanzel, A 2021, ‘Afghanistan: The West Fails – a Win for China and Russia? The Views from Beijing and Moscow’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs: Stiftung Wissenchaft und Politic Comment, no. 50, pp. 1- 5, viewed 22 October 2021,https://www.swp berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2021C50_MoscowBeijing_Afghanistan.pdf
Ghosh, P 2021, ‘Uyghur militants of ETIM left Afghanistan: Taliban assure China’, Hindustan Times, 10 September, viewed 22 October 2021, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/ uyghur-militants-of-etim-left-afghanistan-taliban-assure-china-101631285918334-amp.html
Golovics, J 2017, ‘Contemporary Realism in Theory and Practice: The Case of the Ukrainian Crisis’, Polgári Szemle, Vol. 13, no. 1–3, pp. 362–369, doi: 10.24307/psz.2017.0930
Hindustan Times 2021, ‘China eyes investment opportunity in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, to set up industry platform: Report’, 9 September, viewed 22 October 2021, https:// http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-eyes-investment-opportunity-in-taliban-controlled afghanistan-to-set-up-industry-platform-101631180993928.html
Hong, Z 2013, ‘China’s Afghan Policy: The Forming of the “March West” Strategy’, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 1-29.
Huasheng, Z 2012, ‘China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives’, Center For Strategic and International Studies: A Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program, pp. 1-32, viewed 22 October 2021, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/ legacy_files/files/publication/120322_Zhao_ChinaAfghan_web.pdf
Khan, A 2016, ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan-US-China Quadrilateral Coordination Group’, Issue Brief: Institute of Strategic Studies, pp. 1-5, viewed 22 October 2021, https://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/ uploads/2016/01/Final-Issue-brief-dated-Amina_khan-22-1-2016.pdf
Lobell, SE 2010, ‘Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism’, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, pp. 1-23, https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/ 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-304
Marlow, I, Curran, E 2021, ‘China eyes Afghanistan’s $1 trillion of minerals with risky bet on Taliban’, The Economic Times, 25 August, viewed 22 October 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/china-eyes-afghanistans-1-trillion-of minerals-with-risky-bet-on-taliban/articleshow/85612637.cms?from=mdr
Marsden, M 2021,‘China, Afghanistan, and the Belt and Road Initiative: Diplomacy and Reality’, The Diplomat, 15 September, viewed 22 October 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/china afghanistan-and-the-belt-and-road-initiative-diplomacy-and-reality/
Millward, J, Peterson, D 2020, ‘China’s System of Oppression in Xinjiang: How it Developed and How to Curb it’, Brookings: Global China, Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World, pp. 1-25, viewed 22 October 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ FP_20200914_china_oppression_xinjiang_millward_peterson.pdf
Mohanty, B 2017, ‘China in Afghanistan: Security, Regional Standing, and Status’, ORF Occasional Paper, no. 127, pp. 1-34, viewed 22 October 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/wp content/uploads/2017/10/ORF_OccasionalPaper_126_ChinaAfghanistan_FinalForUpload.pdf
Ng, TP 2010, ‘China’s Role in Shaping the Future of Afghanistan’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Policy Outlook, pp. 1-13, viewed 22 October 2021, https:// carnegieendowment.org/files/china_role_afghanistan.pdf
Pandey, S 2019, ‘Understanding China’s Afghanistan Policy: From Calculated Indifference to Strategic Engagement’, ORF Occasional Paper, no. 305, pp. 1-12, viewed 22 October 2021, https:// http://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ORF_Issue_Brief_China_Afghanistan.pdf
Paul, TV, 2016, ‘The accommodation of rising powers in world politics’, in TV. Paul (ed.), Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present, and Future, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 3–32.
Roy, MS 2017, ‘Afghanistan and the Belt and Road Initiative’, Asia Policy, no. 24, pp. 103-109.
Taliaferro, JW 2000, ‘Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited’, International Security, Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 128–161.
Watson, M 2008, ‘Theoretical traditions in global political economy’, in J Ravenhill (ed.), Global Political Economy, 2nd edn, Oxford University, Oxford, pp. 28-48.
theinquisitivecircle 